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PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE TAXATION IN
TIME OF WAR
Roy BLOUGH*
Five revenue acts in three years have transformed the federal taxation of cor-
porate profits from an income tax taking approximately i7o/ of the $7.2 billion
income of profitable corporations in 1939 to a combined income tax and excess profits
tax which took approximately 56% of a $20.8 billion income of such corporations in
1942. It is expected to take 57% of an income of $23.4 billion in 1943. In the fiscal
year 1940, corporation income and excess profits taxes constituted 21% of total In-
ternal Revenue collections. In the fiscal year 1944, assuming continuation of present
tax laws, corporation income and profits taxes are expected to yield about 35% of
total Internal Revenue collections.'
These striking changes in the amount of corporation taxation might have been
achieved by simple rate increases acting on a rapidly rising volume of corporate in-
come. Actually, however, higher rates have been accompanied, and indeed over-
shadowed, by major changes in the methods of taxing corporations. A wartime
system of taxing corporations, not merely a peacetime prewar system with higher
rates, has been devised and placed in operation.
The changes in corporate tax structure were made because a satisfactory policy
of taxing corporations in time of war involves not merely meeting the need for
increased revenue, but also facing many other problems as well. Some of these
problems were carried over from the prewar years, others have arisen primarily be-
cause of war, and still others relate to the period of postwar readjustment.
Tax problems are presented to Congress in very practical form. Congressional
tax committees are denied the intellectual pleasure of theoretical study, of concen-
trating on some single objective, such as the equity of taxes, with no responsibility
for, or necessary interest in, results of other kinds. Congress and its committees
must act-and act with due regard for all the consequences. Their action takes the
homely forms of specifying precisely what is to be taxed, at what rates the tax is to
be imposed, and how and when it is to be collected. To do this they must balance
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competing considerations and compromise conflicting interests; they must decide-
what results they desire to accomplish; they must achieve those results through
altering an intricate legal and administrative machine that impinges on a complex
economic organization. Congress must do its work in an atmosphere in which al-
most every taxpayer has a special interest to promote and in which a great many
irrelevant issues must be examined and eliminated.
Acceptance of the winning of the war as the primary objective of tax policy is
of some value in facing wartime tax problems, but by no means assures their solution.
Many things are necessary to win the war and frequently they are alternatives--the
more of one, the less of the other. Both ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same
time. It takes a fine sense of balance to get the most benefit from scarce resources.
This balancing is notably difficult in war finance. To take two examples: Heavy
taxation digs into tender flesh, economically speaking; light taxation leaves the door
open to disrupting inflation. Again, high excess profits taxes may drain the vigor
and efficiency of business enterprise; low excess profits taxes may lower the effort
and morale of industrial workers, farmers and soldiers. What is the optimum point?
The changes under consideration here date from 1940. The 194o and 1941 Acts
were passed during the prewar period of "defense." The country had just emerged,
perhaps was still emerging, from a long period of depression. The intellectual and
emotional stigmata of the depression years were still evident. The climate of opinion
changed substantially from i94o to 1942 and 1943; the emphasis among different
problems and aspects of problems shifted. For purposes of convenience, however,
the whole period may be referred to as the "war period," except where greater
precision appears necessary.
PROBLEMS CARRIED OVER PROM THE PREWAR PERIOD
Among the difficulties that Congress faced in constructing a corporate tax struc-
ture for the war were some of long standing which were underscored by the war.
Of these chronic problems, two of the most puzzling- are the measurement of busi-
ness profits and the determination of the proper place of the corporate entity in
taxation.
The measurement of business income
The taxation of any kind of business income, whether corporate, partnership, or
proprietorship, presents perplexing questions. The statement of the amount of in-
come or loss experienced by a business organization during any year must at best
be an approximation; at worst it may bear no discernible relation to the facts as they
are ultimately revealed. Business is a continuing process; to measure the income
for the short segment of one year requires placing values on such things as build-
ings, equipment and inventories from which income is expected to flow in the
future. The present value that is placed on expected future income reflects "the
ectoplasm of a hope, not the solid granite of a fact."
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This dignified guessing of the future is more difficult for long-range projects and
projects in which capital rather than personal service is relatively the most important
factor. These types of business ordinarily employ the corporate form.
Taxation of business income is difficult also because every variety of business has
its own peculiarities of income determination. Measuring the annual incomes of a
mine, a factory, a sales organization, a cattle ranch, and a motion picture studio
involve widely differing complications. While some of these differences can be
recognized in the tax law, the application of uniform rules to all kinds of business
corporations is necessary for practicable administration. This very uniformity makes
inaccuracy unavoidable.
Long-run accuracy in measurement of business income is assisted by allowances
such as those for depreciation, depletion, and loss on retirement of machinery. Errors
in allocating such allowances among years affect the amounts of taxes paid if losses
occur in some years or if tax rates change. Prior to i94o the principal statutory pro-
vision which made possible some adjustment for errors in calculation of the income
of any year was the two-year loss carry-forward provision, which was restored to the
law in 1939. This loss carry-forward provision did not, of course, apply only to
those cases where a loss was due to the erroneous allocation of an item of income or
loss in a given year or the erroneous valuation of an asset as of the beginning or end
of the year. It also served to equalize somewhat the tax between corporations with
violently fluctuating incomes and corporations with relatively stable incomes.
Tax problems inherent in the corporate form
A second difficult peacetime problem carried into the war period was the proper
method of taxing corporations. Corporations are relatively easy to tax. They are all
registered with state governments and cannot readily escape scrutiny. The great
bulk of income and assets are in the hands of relatively few corporations; this means
that auditing is facilitated.
Nevertheless, the business corporation presents perplexing questions of tax policy
because of its characteristics as a form of business organization. The corporation is
not simply a body of people who have joined themselves together to accomplish
some common end. A large business corporation goes far beyond such simple co-
operative group action. On the other hand, the corporation is not a completely
independent entity, a sort of group person existing and functioning without regard
to the natural persons who comprise it. The problem is to devise a method of
taxation which will recognize the dual character of the corporation. A suitable
technique might not be difficult to devise and apply if the relationships between the
stockholders and the corporation were uniform throughout the corporate field.
Actually, however, the relations of the stockholders to each other and to the cor-
porations are of infinite variety, ranging from the close personal intimacy of the
incorporated person or partnership to the impersonal relations of a large public cor-
poration where no one stockholder owns more than a small minority of the voting
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shares. There are large corporations and small corporations; growing corporations,
stable corporations, and declining corporations; corporations with stocks closely held
and corporations with stocks widely distributed; regulated corporations and unreg-
ulated corporations; corporations financed with bond issues, corporations with pre-
ferred stock issues, and corporations with neither; holding corporations and operating
corporations; over-capitalized corporations and under-capitalized corporations; cor-
porations with accumulated deficits and corporations with earned surpluses; corpora-
tions with harmonious stockholders and corporations- with antagonistic minority
interests; corporations run by management, corporations run by bankers, corporations
run by a few large stockholders, corporations run by the mass of stockholders, and
corporations that do not seem to be run by anyone. It is no wonder that a generally
satisfactory method of taxing business corporations, either in peace or in war, re-
mains yet to be imagined, let alone to be devised and adopted.
Although for constitutional reasons, the income tax on corporations' preceded
the income tax on individuals, the corporation tax in the early years after 1913 may
be considered in effect an adjunct to the individual tax. The original corporation
tax rate of i% was the same as the normal tax rate on individual income and divi-
dends received by stockholders were not subject to the normal tax on individuals.
Thus, with respect to the normal tax the corporation tax was analogous to collection
at source. Dividends paid out of corporate capital funds or out of earnings before
March I, 1913 were not subject to normal tax or surtax in the hands of the receiving
stockholders.
The first divergence between corporate and individual normal rates was in 1917,
when the individual normal tax was imposed at two rates, and the corporation
rate was made equal to the higher of the two, and an excess profits tax was imposed.
The divergence continued after World War I. Beginning in i9i9 the corporation
income tax rate was lowered to Io%, but the maximum normal tax rate on indi-
vidual income was still further reduced to 8%. The margin thus introduced be-
tween these two tax rates was widened when the 1921 Act raised the corporation
rate to 12Y20% for 1922, to replace the revenue loss through the repeal of the excess
profits tax. By 1929 the maximum normal tax rate on individual incomes had been
reduced to 4%, while the corporation tax rate, at iio, was nearly three times as
high.
The corporation income tax could thus no longer be regarded merely as an
advance or source collection of the normal individual income taxes On the other
hand, the tax was still not a completely impersonal tax, since individuals were free
from the normal tax on income from dividends. Congress presented no new prin-
ciples of taxation in justification of the change in policy. Such explanations as were
made usually ran in terms of the need for revenue.
' While to avoid constitutional obstacles, the federal corporation tax of rgog was legally a franchise
tax, it was measured by net income. Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
'It was never precisely this, since the individual surtax did not apply, as it does in Great Britain,
to dividends plus corporate tax.
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In x936 an attempt was made to integrate the corporation income tax with the
individual income tax. The House of Representatives, following the recommenda-
tion of the President, passed a bill repealing the income tax on corporations and
replacing it by a tax on undistributed profits. Under this bill distributed income
would have been taxed only in the hands of individuals, while corporations would
have been taxed only on undistributed income. However, the Senate was unwilling
to accept without qualification this new approach to corporate tax problems. An
undistributed profits tax was finally adopted. But the corporation income tax was
retained and the rate graduated for corporate incomes of less than $40,000. In addi-
tion, individuals were no longer permitted to exclude dividends from income for
normal tax purposes.
This compromise, which was incorporated in the 1936 Act, accentuated still
further the issue of personal or impersonal taxation of corporation income. While
the undistributed profits tax was an impersonal tax, its purpose and tendency was
to bring income earned by corporations into the orbit of personal taxation; thus
the corporation tax served as a supplement to the tax on individual income. But
the denial of the dividend deduction to individuals was a move in the direction of
impersonal taxation. The undistributed profits tax was vigorously criticized. In
1938 the rates were sharply cut and a date of expiration was set, and in 1939 the
tax was allowed to lapse as of the end of the year. Only minor ties remained be-
tween corporation and individual taxes. They included an old penalty tax on income
that is withheld from distribution in order to avoid individual income tax, a new
(937) tax on undistributed earnings of personal holding companies, and a provision
(1939) for exemption from corporate tax of certain investment companies except
with respect to undistributed income.
Aggravation of problems by the war
With the approach and outbreak of the war the difficulties involved in taxing
corporations became more serious. The unsettled conditions brought about by the
-war, the conversion of plants and facilities to wartime production, the expectation
that reconversion would one day be necessary, rapid changes in prices and costs,
more difficult measurements of depreciation and obsolescense, the greater uncertainty
of markets-all these factors combined to increase the difficulty of computing cor-
porate profits in any year. There was even the question of accurately -computing
corporate profits for the war period as a whole. Apparently large wartime profits
might be offset by the loss of capital value due to a shift of markets, the entry of
competitors or the discovery of new technique and equipment. What appeared to
be a profit in one year or even for the whole war period might turn out to be a
loss, and what appeared to be a large profitrmight turn out to be a small one.
Not only were the dangers of making errors in the computation of income
greater during the war than in the preceding time of peace but these errors became
of increasing importance. If the rates of tax are low, errors in the calculation of
profits from year to year are of relatively small significance. At a io% rate of tax
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it is rarely a matter of serious concern for the capital position of the corporation
whether or not its profits are correctly computed. Even if twice as much profit is
taxed as is actually realized the corporation still has 8oo of its profits left to pay
dividends and build up its capital. High tax rates, however, make a free and easy
attitude toward the accuracy of profit computation a serious matter. If an excess-
profits tax of 80/ or 9O/o is imposed, and if by some mistake in calculation or in
definition the profits are figured at twice their actual level, the tax may take not
8o% or 9o of the profits but i6o% or 18o/. If such errors should continue over a
period of time the business would go bankrupt. In any event there would be an
actual loss after taxes instead of a profit.
Accordingly an important objective of wartime tax policy was to improve the
calculation of profits or to make possible the hindsight adjustment in profits so
that only actual profits would be subject to tax.
High rates of corporate tax also aggravated the discrimination against the cor-
poration as a method of earning income to the extent that income was distributed
in dividends. Low rates of tax on corporate profits would have discriminated in
favor of the corporation to the extent that income was not distributed in dividends
during the period of high war income tax rates. High corporate rates were par-
ticularly appropriate for those concerns whose incomes increased during the war
since such increases were undoubtedly in general due to the war and the Govern-
ment's war expenditures. For concerns whose profits had not increased, however,
higher rates of taxation meant that the discrimination caused by the fact that the
corporation was an intermediary between the individual stockholders and the source
of income became more serious.
PROBLEMS ARISING PRIMARILy Our OF THE WAR
Added to the peacetime problems of corporate taxation, accentuated in time of
war, were other problems attributable largely or solely to the war. The Govern-
ment's revenue requirements were so much increased by the war as to constitute a
difficulty almost of different kind instead of merely one of different degree. Profits
growing out of war production presented a point of controversy. The overwhelming
importance of unimpeded wartime production had to be reckoned with. Inflation
threatened after a long stretch of years during which deflation had been the con-
dition to be remedied.
There were other problems raised by the war which would be met after the
war. These were truly wartime issues because they cast their shadows before them
and affected the activities of both businessmen and Government in the considera-
tion of war taxes. Another class of postwar questions may be anticipated during
the war and provision made to'go into effect after the war, but these are not truly
wartime problems if nothing need actually be done during the war.
The distinction between a war tax problem and a wartime postwar problem
may appear to be tenuous. Both arise out of the war; both call for consideration
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during the war. The difference would appear to be this; if it affects production
during the war, it is a war problem, but if it affects the postwar situation of indus-
try, it is a postwar problem. An illustration may make this distinction clearer.
The amortization legislation of 1940 was not intended primarily to protect industry
in the postwar period and insure its equitable treatment then. The purpose of the
legislation was to get on with war production which was allegedly being delayed
by the unwillingness of business to make investments in wartime plants and equip-
ment because of the uncertainty of getting back the investment. On the other hand,
proposals for tax deductions for postwar reconversion reserves have been put for-
ward, not so much to increase wartime production as to insure the existence after
the war of the type of industrial machine and business control which is deemed
desirable for that period, and to provide a correction for one source of error in
statements of wartime profits.
The problems affecting conduct during war will be discussed in this section;
the postwar problems seen growing out of the war and thereby affecting the war
tax program will be discussed in the following section.
Additional revenue requirements
New revenue is an obvious wartime tax problem. As defense expenditures
accelerated and then became war expenditures running up to unheard of levels, the
need for greater revenue correspondingly expanded. Although some students of
taxation are opposed to levying more than a nominal rate of tax on corporations,
this view was not shared by the Congress. Members have pointed out from time
to time that their constituents would not understand why the taxes on individuals
should be increased unless the taxes on corporations were increased by at least a
corresponding amount. Moreover, the ease of taxing corporate profits perhaps made
inevitable the raising of a substantial portion of the newly raised revenue from the
business corporations of the country. Finally, the strong influence of the high indi-
vidual rates and other factors to discourage dividend payments during the war made
higher corporate rates a necessity for tax equity, despite a resulting element of
inequity.
Prevention and recapture of excessive profits
Although the need of revenue was responsible for substantial increases in cor-
poration taxes during the war, the high corporation excess profits tax rates were
not primarily the result of the need for revenue. The increased revenue could have
been derived more simply and with less expenditure of time and energy by the
Congress through higher income tax rates than by imposing the excess profits tax
at such high rates that all sorts of relief provisions were required to prevent the
heavy tax from causing hardships.
The primary reason for the excess profits tax was the public pressure for the
limitation of wartime profits. Such pressure was not restricted to the United States.
Both Great Britain and Canada imposed excess profits taxes early in the war at
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very high rates. It was felt, at least in the democratic countries, that no one should
make an inordinate profit out of a war in which conscripted men were risking their
lives and in which many small businesses were being destroyed. There were wide
differences as to what constituted unreasonable profits. Although unreasonable
profits were obviously profits in excess of reasonable profits, the word "reasonable"
added nothing to definiteness. Reasonable profits were interpreted by different
people to mean everything from a sort of guarantee of peactime profits after all
taxes plus a generous percentage from the additional wartime business, down to
almost no profits at all. But there was no difference of opinion on the point that,
above some level, profits were undesirable in time of war and that insofar as prac-
ticable such excess profits should be completely wiped out.
This public attitude involved more than a matter of equity. It directly affected
the production of goods necessary to the prosecution of the war, and the main-
tenance of stable economic conditions. The point was clear that income stabiliza-
tion was needed. A policy of wage control developed; workers were expected to
put forth their maximum efforts with stabilized wages and salaries. Price control
likewise evolved; it was highly desirable that farmers raise maximum crops with
stabilized farm prices. The cooperation in the war effort which could be expected
of these groups whose incomes were limited would depend at least in part on what
they saw happening to the incomes of other people who were not subject to the
same types of restriction. These other incomes were primarily in the form of
business profits-the profits of people who were employers of labor, some of whom
were processors of farm products. The excess profits tax was the instrument
adopted to restrict the incomes of this group. The success of the tax in securing
the full cooperation of labor and farm groups would be one of the tests of its
adequacy.
An important problem in the excess profits tax was the measurement of ex-
cessiveness and around this question was waged a vigorous fight. One view was
that wartime profits were unreasonable when they were unusually high as com-
pared to invested capital, regardless of how high they had been before the war.
The other view was that profits were excessive when they were larger than before
the war. The revenue acts of the First World War had incorporated taxes based
on both of these tests of excessiveness. Whether or not both tests should be employed
in the present war became an important issue.
There was no lack of discussion of war taxation in the decade prior to the war
and almost all of it was devoted to the problem of preventing or recapturing excess
profits in wartime. During the years between i93o and 194o, numerous war finance
bills and resolutions were discussed in both Houses of Congress. Some of them
dealt with such questions as price fixing and profit limitation, or restriction. A
large number of them were concerned with wartime taxation, and centered mainly
around recommendations of the War Policy Commission4 made in 1932, and rec-
I H. R. Doc. No. 264, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932).
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ommendations of the Special Committee on the Investigation of the Munitions
Industry' made in 1935. The former proposed a flat rate tax of 95/ on profits in
excess of the average of the three preceding years. The latter committee recom-
mended that profits in excess of 6%o of the invested capital be taxed at a iooo rate.
The discussion of excess profits taxation was thus important in Congress long before
the excess profits tax was passed in 1940.
A profit recapture plan was placed in operation as early as 1934 with the passage
of the Vinson-Trammel Act. This act provided for the recapture of all profits in
excess of ro% of the contract price realized in the construction of naval vessels and
aircraft. This type of provision was modified and extended in the years prior to
the war.
Promotion of war production
Opposed to the considerations favoring heavy excess profits taxation were other
considerations which raised a warning hand against rates so high as to weaken
enterprise and destroy the incentive to efficiency. It may be doubted that the profit
motive as such is of great importance in wartime. Few patriotic Americans would
refuse to do their utmost in war endeavor, regardless of the size of profits. But it
is not merely a matter of the size of profits; the question is also one of the loss of
capital.
Although the Federal Government took many of the risks out of wartime busi-
ness through its policy of furnishing capital, either in the form of facilities or in
the form of loans, there was still a good deal of risk placed on private industry.
The very size of the business in relation to the amount of private capital increased
the risk of the loss of that capital through misjudgment or inadvertence. There
was also a good deal of work and responsibility; and while this was no doubt offset
to a considerable extent by the pleasures of management and the feeling of contri-
bution to the war effort, there was nevertheless a general feeling that business profits
must be not only reasonably low, but also reasonably high-high enough to reflect
a reasonable return for the risk run and the managerial effort expended. Unfor-
tunately, the ideas of what the entrepreneurial and managerial groups considered a
reasonably high return, and what labor and farm groups and the public generally
considered a reasonably low return, were not necessarily identical.
More definitely related to profit margins than is incentive to wartime effort is the
incentive to efficiency of operation. Even in the absence of net profits after taxes,
business managers and stockholders have an incentive to keep down costs during the
war, since should the cost structure become inflated and distorted, the ability of the
concern to compete in the postwar period would be impaired. This incentive is
greatly strengthened by the provision for carry-back of losses and unused excess-
profits credit, which provision makes even the profits that go to the Government
in taxes valuable for purposes of future carry-back. However, there are offsetting
I SEN. REP. No. 944, Pt. i, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
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forces. High excess profits taxes, by reducing the net return on each dollar of out-
put, make high costs less important. If paying higher wages will assure production
and especially if those higher wages will be paid for by the Government in its
higher contract prices, the tendency is strong to make the payments to labor and
secure its good will during the war and perhaps for the postwar period. If adver-
tising can be expected to yield results even at some future period, cost is a relatively
minor factor if 8o% is being paid by the Government through lower excess profits
taxes. With regard to these and other elements of cost, high taxes on profits un-
doubtedly reduce the incentive to maintain business efficiency.
Various devices grew out of the effort to resolve the conflict between considera-
tions for and considerations against a high excess-profits tax. Carry-forward and
carry-back of unused excess-profits credit, the adjustment of the credit through
"general relief," and the postwar credit were among these devices.
A special problem of promoting war production, which became acute in 1940,
concerned the treatment for tax purposes of new plants and facilities constructed
for the production of war goods. Manufacturers were reluctant to undertake these
specialized capital investments without assurance that the loss of value during the
war could be deducted from wartime profits. The problem involved a special
application of deductions for depreciation and obsolescence. If wartime facilities
were useless and worthless after the war, how was the manufacturer to get back
his investment? The law provided then, as now, that depreciation' might be taken
as a deduction, as could obsolescence. Depreciation is based on physical life which
might extend far beyond the end of the war. Obsolescence relates to economic loss
of value, but is a difficult concept to apply administratively. It is hard to recognize
obsolescence while it is occurring. It is sometimes difficult to determine that it has
occurred and even more difficult to put a date on the occurrence. Obsolescence
resembles loss in capital value due to shifts in demand, cyclically low production,
and other more purely market factors in periods of business decline. Failure to
distinguish obsolescence from these other factors would be of little significance to a
correct statement of profits in the absence of business recovery. But business re-
covery causes capital appreciation in situations where obsolescence was not the cause
of the earlier value decline. Truly obsolete equipment does not ordinarily appre-
ciate when markets recover, since such equipment will have been replaced by tech-
nically superior and newer equipment. If all declines in capital are to be allowed
as deductions from income then the restorations in capital value reflecting the
restoration of markets should be counted as income. But taxing as income such
accrued capital values not only outrages accounting traditions as to the nature of
income, it also magnifies fluctuations of income and taxes and may lead to col-
lecting taxes without regard to the business done and the profitability of operations.
Just how important were the uncertainties of charging depreciation and obso-
lescence against the income of the proper year is impossible to say. If the new
plants were of such a character that they could continue to be useful after the war,
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the amount of depreciation allowed under the Internal Revenue laws would be
adequate as an income tax deduction. On the other hand, if the assets proved of
little or no use after the war, either because the products would be useless in peace-
time or because of an overabundance of such facilities in the postwar period or be-
cause of war inspired technological improvement, the usual deduction for deprecia-
tion would be inadequate to return the investment and reflect the true income earned
during the war. The amount of difference this would make in taxes would depend
on the rates of the tax and the income or loss position of the corporation in the
postwar years. At any rate, businessmen insisted on special legislation to assure
them that they would be able to take the cost of their wartime facilities as deduc-
tions during the war.
No exact solution was conceivable except a promise to recompute profits after
the war, and promises were not definite enough. Measures that were definite were
bound to result in inequities. Allowing deduction during the war of the full cost
of the assets would understate the war profits of some concerns and thus undertax
them. Failure to allow especially rapid deduction would, on the other hand, result
in the overtaxing of other corporations. Advance determination of which situation
would prevail could not be made for specific cases. Special amortization legislation
was certain in any event to fall short of a fully satisfactory solution.
Control of inflation
Another important objective of war taxation is to contribute in maximum de-
gree to the prevention and control of inflation. Because wartime inflation is due
to an excess of spending power in a period of shortages of goods and services, the
withdrawal of income through taxation is generally recognized to be an important
instrument of inflation control. The circumstances which made the need for in-
flation control obvious in the latter half of 1943, were, however, not apparent in any
great degree in the summer of 1940 when corporate tax revision for the war period
was first undertaken. At that time the country was gradually emerging from a
period of unemployment, low prices, and stagnant business. There was a substan-
tial amount of room for growth in the output of the business machine without
pressing on the capacity for production. Accordingly, the possible inflationary in-
fluence on prices of the increased governmental expenditures for defense purposes
did not appear to be an important factor.
Even when productive capacity was approached and the strain of excess spend-
ing power on price controls became all too clear, the function of taxation as an
instrument of inflation control was not given the acceptance or at any rate the
emphasis which it received in some quarters. Several explanatory factors may be
suggested. There are many problems on the minds of members of Congress, and
little time for the complications of fiscal theory. The emphasis on price control
and rationing indicates a preference for those methods of preventing inflation.
Again, the legislator is close to the people back home. He sees each of them as a
human being trying to improve his economic situation. Very few people are aware
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that they are contributing to inflation. If their income rises, they feel that at long
last they are receiving more nearly the reward which their labors had long since
entitled them to. The cost of living, to be sure, threatens this newly found pros-
perity and security, but taxes would threaten them also. The average person
apparently does not see increases in taxes as holding any benefit for him; rather he
sees taxes as a reduction in his ability to buy, thus striking at the possibility of his
reaping his overdue reward.
Even to the believer in taxation as a fundamental method of preventing and
controlling inflation, the corporation does not appear as close to the inflationary
picture as the individual. When corporations expand their facilities they spend
money and thus contribute to the demand for goods and services on the market.
But in the summer of 1940 there were few actual or threatened shortages of a
character to give cause for immediate alarm. In 1941 and especially in 1942 and
1943 when shortages began to arise and finally became very critical, the system of
priorities and the very existence of the shortages themselves reduced the ability of
corporations to expand facilities for other than essential war purposes and indeed fre-
quently prevented them from replacing deteriorating equipment or depleted inven-
tories. Accordingly, money in the hands of corporations did not directly contribute
in a large degree to the pressure on prices.
Of course, when corporations pay out their earnings in the form of dividends
the pressure on prices is increased because of the larger incomes in the hands of
the consuming public. Wartime dividend policies have been in general conserv-
ative because of high corporate and individual taxes, the costs of conversion to war
production, the requirements of expanding war production, and the felt need for
accumulating reserves and perhaps for other reasons.
In brief, the control of inflation was probably of little moment in 194o and
apparently had little, if any, influence on the revenue legislation of that year. In
1941 and 1942 the control of inflation had become of more importance for tax
policy generally, but it was probably not an important factor in determining the
increasingly high corporate tax rates.
WARTIME PosTWAR PROBLEMS
As the war progressed, more and more attention was given to the problems of
the postwar period. What were businesses to do when the flow of war orders had
ceased and the necessity to reconvert and readjust the plants and equipment to
peacetime use became an immediate necessity? Wartime tax policy could not re-
move the problem. The best it could do would be to leave businesses in as favor-
able a position as possible to continue after the war consistent with a minimum of
conflict with the wartime objectives of taxation.
Part of the trouble went back to the difficulty of measuring profits, especially in
time of war. If, after the war was over, part of the wartime profits were found to
have been apparent but not real, taxation might have impaired the capital of the
company and left it worse off than it was before the war so far as capital was con-
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cerned. This undesirable result was avoided to a considerable extent by providing
a loss carry-back of two years. The loss carry-back method had the disadvantage
that it made no distinction between wartime losses tied up so closely with wartime
profits as to constitute a genuine adjustment of such profits, and ordinary business
losses of the postwar competitive struggle.
The cost of postwar reconversion became a particular item of interest during
the early part of 1943. It was felt by some observers that the loss carry-back pro-
vision was inadequate and that something additional should be allowed to free
from taxation such amount of wartime income as would be used up in recon-
version to peacetime operation. But the problem was peculiarly puzzling. Dur-
ing the war it was scarcely feasible to determine which companies would have to
reconvert, or the probable costs of reconversion. Many corporations would never
go back to their prewar line of business. Moreover, at the time of adjustment to
peacetime conditions it was certain to prove difficult to ascertain which outlays
should be chargeable as expense of reconversion, and which should be considered
normal capital expansion to meet a new business situation.
The concern with the postwar conditions in which corporations would find
themselves extended beyond the correction of wartime income to the cash position
of the corporation. The cash problem is not at all the same problem as the prob-
lem of correctly figuring costs. A corporation with large assets and ample profits
may be in a very illiquid position while another corporation may be very liquid
and yet have made no profits. Although open or concealed rate reductions would.
affect the amount of cash a corporation would have at the end of the war, the
problem of the cash position is largely in the field of business management and its
relief is perhaps to be found in the banking and credit field. For concerns with
war contracts, the policy of contract termination is also important for the postwar
cash position.
There are other postwar problems, such as the future competitive situation
among firms and industries, which are also sometimes presented as part of the
wartime tax picture, but for the most part these seem rather far removed from the
area in which wartime tax policy can be a helpful instrument.
The problems which Congress had faced during the past few years in deter-
mining wartime corporate tax policy are seen from this examination to be com-
plex and confusing and full of conflicting considerations. No policy could have
satisfied in full all the tests of good war finance. It has been necessary to balance
considerations, to choose among conflicting interests. As the war passes into history
it will appear more dearly whether the balancing has been intelligent and the
choices best for the general welfare. But for Congress the end of the war will
bring no rest from concern with corporate taxation matters. The wartime structure
is obviously not suited to the postwar area; then the peacetime problems of cor-
porate taxation will call for solutions adapted to new times and new conditions.
